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Abstract 
 
Since the first modern state-sponsored lottery was instituted in New Hampshire in 
1964, lotteries have proliferated to 42 states and the District of Colombia.  With little 
exception, research has shown that these lotteries are a highly regressive form of taxation.  
However, this body of research does not take into account a theoretical finding that the 
manner in which collected funds are earmarked impacts participation patterns.  The goal 
of this dissertation is to test this finding empirically. 
In the first analysis, I use sales data from the Tennessee Education Lottery and 
scholarship data from the TEL Scholarship program to test this theory directly.  I find that 
instant game sales are increasing in the number of scholarships awarded in a given county 
and that the implicit tax incidence is less regressive than in certain other states.  I also 
find that the relationship between scholarships and sales is stronger in higher income 
counties.  Theory does not hold for Powerball sales.  This may be due to a misconception 
that buying into a multi-state game does not directly subsidize programs in Tennessee. 
In the second analysis, I focus on the Texas Lottery, which began as a revenue 
stream for the state’s General Fund, but eventually became a dedicated revenue stream 
for K-12 education.  I exploit this change to test for a structural break in the demand for 
two lottery games.  Then, I extend an existing theory of lottery demand to take this 
structural break into account.  I find that there is a structural break at the time the earmark 
is implemented, and that the lottery is less regressive after the earmark. 
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Chapter 1  
The Economics of State Lotteries 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 Lotteries have a long and storied history in America.  In 1776, a lottery was 
authorized to raise money for the Colonial Army.  Shortly thereafter, states and localities 
implemented lotteries to support specific expenditures when other means of taxation were 
not feasible.   After the Civil War, a period of moral resistance resulted in prohibitions 
against legalized gambling.  However, in 1964, New Hampshire instituted the first 
modern state lottery and, very quickly, other New England states followed suit. 
 Today, 43 states and the District of Colombia use lotteries as a mechanism to fund 
public programs.  Much like the early American lotteries, most state lotteries are 
instituted to fund narrowly defined programs.  About 90% of lottery states earmark 
lottery proceeds in whole or in part for specific programs.  These earmarks are important 
politically, as lottery legislation often faces significant hurdles, such as constitutional 
amendments and public referendums.  Not surprisingly, education is the most popular 
recipient of lottery proceeds, despite skepticism about whether such earmarks actually 
increase education funding dollar-for-dollar. 
 However, few studies examine the material importance of the earmarks to the 
potential players of the lottery.  Morgan (2000) introduces a theoretical model 
demonstrating how lottery players respond to the value of the public good funded by their 
contributions.  He finds that lottery purchases (ie, contributions to the public good) are 
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increasing in the value of the public good that is funded.  Further research (Landry and 
Price 2007) looks at highly aggregated sales data from lottery states, demonstrating that 
lottery purchases per capita are higher in states that earmark for education and that casino 
gambling is only a substitute for lottery play in states that do not earmark.   
 The purpose of this dissertation is to test Morgan’s theory on a micro level.  I do 
this with data sets from two different lottery states, Tennessee and Texas.  I discuss the 
unique analyses for each state in Chapters 2 and 3.  In this chapter, I discuss prior 
literature on the economics of state lotteries and the underlying theory describing why 
earmarks should be a part of lottery demand models. 
1.2 Prior Literature 
 Although a lottery is not a conventional form of taxation, it does impose an 
implicit tax on the player.  Because a fixed portion of the cost of a lottery ticket is state 
revenue, the tax is in fact very high (often 50% or more) on the actual value of the good 
(the expected prize).  Lottery corporations are rarely explicit about the expected value of 
lottery tickets (particularly instant game tickets) which means that calculating the 
expected prize isn’t a straightforward exercise.  However, it is possible to get a crude 
measure of the tax rate of lottery games in a state by comparing the total dollar value of 
prizes awarded with total transfers to the government.  For instance, in fiscal year 2010, 
the Tennessee Education Lottery transferred $288.87 million to the state for its lottery-
funded education programs while awarding 707.17 million in prizes.
1
   This implies an 
average tax rate of 40.8%. A similar calculation reveals that the tax rate on lottery tickets 
was 43.3% in Texas in fiscal year 2010.
2
  As previously mentioned, the regressive nature 
of a state lottery’s implicit tax is well documented.  This conclusion has been reached 
using a variety of statistical and data methods.   
First, lottery studies differ in the type of data used to estimate lottery ticket 
purchases.  Early research often used surveys of state residents or winners (Brinner and 
Clotfelter 1975; Clotfelter and Cook 1987; Brown et al. 1992; Spiro 1974; Herring and 
                                                 
1
 Tennessee Education Lottery 2010 Annual Report. http://www.tnlottery.com/aboutus/reports.aspx 
2
 Texas Lottery 2010 Annual Report.  http://www.txlottery.org/export/sites/lottery/Documents/ 
Audited_AFR_FY_2010_-_FINAL.pdf 
3 
 
Bledsoe 1994; Miyazaki et al. 1996; Langenderfer 1996; Burns et al. 1990).  Other 
research used publicly available data on winners, assuming that winners are a random 
subsample of lottery players (Clotfelter and Cook 1987; Brinner and Clotfelter 1975).  
The most popular method, however, of approximating the individual demand for lottery 
tickets is the use of sales data aggregated by city (Jackson 1994), zip code (Oster 2004; 
Clotfelter 1979; Price and Novak 1999), or county (Garrett and Coughlin 2009; Miyazaki 
et al. 1998; Hansen et al. 2000; Hansen 1995; Mikesell 1989; Brinner and Clotfelter 
1975).  
I use county-aggregated data from Tennessee and zip code-aggregated data from 
Texas in this study.  Although there may be concerns about the homogeneity of income 
(and therefore the distribution of lottery purchases) across a given geographic area, there 
are several advantages to using county-aggregated data.  First, it eliminates response 
biases that are likely to exist in survey data.  Second, unlike research on lottery winners 
only, county aggregated data allow me to estimate tax incidence on the entire population 
rather than just players.   
Second, lottery studies differ in the statistical estimation of tax incidence.  Some 
calculate a Suits index (Brinner and Clotfelter 1975; Miyazaki et al. 1998; Clotfelter 
1979; Clotfelter and Cook 1987; Price and Novak 1999; Hansen 1995; Spiro 1974).
3
 
Other papers estimate income elasticity (Oster 2004; Garrett and Coughlin 2009; Hansen 
et al. 2000; Price and Novak 1999; Jackson 1994; Borg and Mason 1988; Mikesell 1989).  
These authors estimate the income elasticity by using a double log model (expressing 
both the dependent variable used to approximate lottery demand and the independent 
income variable in natural logs).  The drawback to this approach is that it estimates a 
constant elasticity.  Some, but not all, of these authors also include point estimates for 
various income brackets or estimate other functional forms of the double log model as a 
robustness check.   
                                                 
3
 A Suits index in this context is calculated from a Lorenz curve derived by plotting accumulated lottery 
sales against accumulated state income.  The area under this curve is compared to a line of equality to 
calculate the Suits index.  A number less than zero implies a regressive tax.  A number greater than zero 
implies a progressive tax.  For more information, see Suits (1977). 
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 In addition to estimates of tax elasticity, these papers consistently find that lottery 
play is affected by certain demographic characteristics.  For instance, increased lottery 
play is consistent with less formal education, minority status, increased age, and 
participation in other forms of gambling.  Therefore, controlling for the demographic 
characteristics of county populations is important when estimating the demand for lottery 
tickets.   
Moreover, there are differences in the income elasticity between lottery games.  
Price and Novak (1999) estimate the tax incidence of the Texas lottery, looking at three 
games independently.  They find that instant games are the most regressive, large prize 
numbers games are the least regressive, and small prize numbers games are in between.  
Due to this finding, I estimate the income elasticity separately for each lottery game, 
rather than using aggregate sales data.   
Finally, Oster (2004) finds that Powerball sales become less regressive as the 
prize increases.  Therefore, in Chapter 2, I control for the size of the advertised Powerball 
prize when I calculate income elasticities in Tennessee.  In Chapter 3, I test Oster’s 
results using sales of a jackpot numbers game in Texas. 
 Despite an extensive literature regarding the tax incidence of state lotteries, no 
research has incorporated the importance of the value of the public good funded with 
lottery revenue.  The theoretical foundation for this relevance is introduced by Morgan 
(2000).  Morgan views lotteries as a practical means of overcoming the free-rider 
problem in the provision of public goods.  He assumes that agents are risk-neutral 
expected utility maximizers with heterogeneous preferences and quasi-linear utility 
functions.  The assumption of risk-neutrality is of particular importance, as love-of-
gambling or risk-seeking behaviors are often assumed to be the motives for playing a 
lottery with a negative expected return.  However, as Morgan demonstrates, this may not 
be the case when a socially desirable public good is funded with the proceeds. 
  The sensitivity of lottery play to the value of the public good funded has been 
tested relatively little, despite heterogeneity in lottery earmarks across states.  Landry and 
Price (2006) compare total per capita expenditures in states that earmark for education 
and those that do not.  They find that expenditures are higher in states that earmark for 
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education, suggesting that perhaps the earmark in and of itself affects the level of play.  
They also find that the introduction of casino gambling negatively impacts lotto play in 
general fund states but has no impact in states that earmark for education.  This calls into 
question whether love of gambling is the main driver of lottery purchases in states that 
earmark. 
 It is important to note that earmarking for education in one way or another (K-12, 
higher education supplements, student scholarships) is by far the most popular earmark 
among states, despite evidence that lottery funds do not fully supplement, rather than 
supplant, other funding.  Pantusco, Seyfried and Stonebraker (2007) find that earmarking 
proceeds for education does not typically increase education expenditures more than 
placing lottery proceeds in the state general fund.  Evans and Zhang (2007) find that 50-
70 cents of each lottery dollar earmarked for K-12 education ends up in local school 
districts, in contrast to 30 cents in states that deposit lottery revenue into a general fund.   
However, actually funding the program(s) in question may be a secondary reason 
to push certain earmarks.  States seeking to institute a lottery typically face a deeply 
divided electorate.  Moral objections to legalized gambling and ideological objections to 
highly regressive taxation generate staunch opposition.  It is possible that such earmarks 
serve a political purpose, softening marginal opposition and allowing lottery legislation 
and referendums to pass.   
 Some studies have examined the budgetary incidence of lotteries with these 
specific earmarks, thereby calculating a “net incidence.”  Borg and Mason (1988) find 
that earmarking lottery proceeds for education in Illinois reduces the implied regressivity, 
but does not eliminate it.  Similarly, Rubenstein and Scafidi (2002) examine the Georgia 
Lottery for Education and find that regressivity is not eliminated by earmarking for 
education programs.  In particular, they find that expenditures on the Georgia HOPE 
Scholarship for higher education exacerbate this net regressivity, as benefits typically 
accrue to higher-income Georgians.   
A 2004 study by Stranahan and Borg is of particular interest because it estimates 
the net budgetary incidence of the Florida Bright Futures scholarship, a lottery-funded 
scholarship program that is similar in structure to, though smaller than, the Tennessee 
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Education Lottery Scholarship program.  The authors conclude that the lottery tax-funded 
scholarships disproportionately benefit high-income, well-educated, white households.  
This is consistent with the findings of Rubenstein and Scafadi.   
According to the theory in Morgan (2000), this finding corresponds to a public 
good with a marginal per capita return that increases with income.  Therefore, I would 
expect to find that lottery sales are less regressive in a state which earmarks most lottery 
revenue for scholarships, such as Tennessee, relative to a state that earmarks for K-12 
education, such as Texas, or does not earmark at all.   
1.3 Theory 
Although Morgan (2000) first presented theory demonstrating that lottery play is 
affected by the good funded with revenue, Lange, List, and Price (2007) extend that 
theory to allow lottery players to have heterogeneous values for the public good.  I 
present here a simplified version of that theory.  The comparative statics derived below 
have important implications for the empirical analysis that follows. 
Morgan views a lottery as a means of overcoming the free rider problem in the 
provision of public goods.  When a classic voluntary contributions mechanism is used to 
fund a public good, each participant contributes zero in equilibrium.  However, when a 
lottery is added as a means of inducing participation, players then get two returns, the 
expected prize and the return from the public good.  If the return from the public good is 
sufficiently high, even risk-neutral players may maximize utility through participation.   
Assume that players are heterogeneous in the return from the public good.  
Therefore, an individual faces a linear utility function of the form:  
)(* GhP
tt
t
twU i
ii
i
ii 



 
where ii tw   is the individual’s income, net of contributions to the public good (lottery 
ticket purchases), P
tt
t
ii
i *

 is the expected value of the lottery prize, and ih  is the 
individual’s valuation of the public good.  Total public goods provision is given by 
PttG ii   . 
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The individual’s contribution (ticket purchase) decision is defined by the first 
order condition  
1)('
)(
*
2

 
 Gh
tt
t
P i
ii
i . 
Individuals are heterogeneous in the marginal per capita return from the public good, ih' .  
Stranahan and Borg (2004) show that the MPCR of higher education scholarships 
increases with income.  Therefore, if G is a higher education scholarship program, as 'h  
increases, it must be that the first term of the FOC decreases for equilibrium to hold.  
Note that the first term decreases faster in it  than in it . 
As income increases, 'h  increases, and it follows that the contributions of all 
other individuals falls as a proportion of total contributions.  As the share of the higher-
income individuals’ contributions increases, the implicit tax becomes less regressive. 
Intuitively, higher income individuals typically play the lottery less because they 
recognize that it is a poor bet. As a result, the lottery tax is regressive.  However, if 
Morgan’s theory is true, the expected value of winnings is not the only return from 
purchasing a lottery ticket.  It may be that the marginal per capita return of the public 
good sufficiently augments the “bad bet” to induce participation.  The result is less 
regressivity overall. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are empirical tests of the principles of this theory.  In Chapter 2, 
I directly test the link between the value of the public good and purchases of lottery 
tickets in Tennessee.  Because Tennessee allocates the vast majority of lottery revenue to 
fund college scholarships, the number of scholarships awarded in a given county serves 
as a proxy for the value of the public good.   I test whether this proxy is correlated with 
sales, holding other common determinants of lottery demand constant.  In Chapter 3, I 
extend Oster’s (2004) model which suggests that the regressivity of a jackpot-driven 
numbers game decreases when the prize increases.  I use data from the Texas lottery, 
which began earmarking five years after sales began, to test for a structural break in 
demand and in the relationship between prizes and regressivity. 
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Chapter 2 
The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship 
Program and Lottery Sales 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive body of research which examines the tax incidence of state 
lotteries.  The vast majority of this work confirms that lotteries are regressive.  That is, as 
the income of an individual rises, on average, the share of income spent on lottery tickets 
declines.  However, despite numerous studies on lottery ticket demand and the incidence 
of the implicit tax, none have incorporated the findings of Morgan (2000) and Landry and 
Price (2007) that the value of the public good funded by lottery revenue may bear 
significance.  In this chapter, I calculate a tax incidence of Tennessee’s lottery which is 
comparable to prior research.  Then, I extend prior models of lottery demand by including 
a proxy for the value of the public good.   
I do this by examining sales data from the Tennessee Education Lottery.  The 
TEL has three unique features which make it ideal for this study.  First, it allocates the 
majority of net revenue to college scholarships.
4
  Second, there are merit- and need-based 
scholarships available to students attending private post-secondary schools in Tennessee.  
                                                 
4
 As of December 31, 2008, 86% of all expenditures from the Lottery for Education account since its 
creation in January 2004 funded scholarships.  The remainder funded after-school programs, pre-
kindergarten programs, and administrative costs.  The Lottery for Education account holds revenue net of 
prize payouts and retailer commissions. 
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This allows students from a very wide range of income to benefit from the scholarship 
program.  Third, since the inception of the TEL Scholarship program, there have been a 
number of increases to the size of the program, generally in the form of reduced academic 
standards to receive the grant (not in the dollar value of the grant).  These changes in the 
number of scholarships awarded are subject to legislative action and, therefore, not 
directly correlated with sales.   
To test Morgan’s theory, I must use a proxy for the value of the public good.  This 
proxy is generated using a unique data set, records of Tennessee Education Lottery 
scholarship recipients.  If Morgan’s theory holds empirically, a change in the number of 
scholarship recipients will have a significant effect on lottery play, holding all other 
indicators of lottery play constant. 
I find that sales of instant games (scratch-off tickets) in Tennessee are less 
regressive than instant game sales as reported in at least one prior study based on sales in 
another state.  I find the income elasticity of instant games to be either 0.55 or 0.085, 
depending on the income measure used.  Instant games often have a negative elasticity.  
In addition, consistent with theory, it appears that at least part of this change in 
regressivity can be attributed to the value of the public good funded with lottery revenue.  
Furthermore, I find that the relationship between scholarships and play is not consistent 
across incomes.  Higher income counties tend to respond more strongly to an increase in 
scholarships than do poorer counties.  This heterogeneity of scholarships and lottery play 
suggest that earmarking a state lottery for a good whose benefits rise with income may 
reduce the regressivity of the lottery.  Theory does not hold for Tennessee Powerball 
sales.  However, because Powerball is a multi-state game, there may be confusion 
regarding the allocation of proceeds. 
Section 2.2 provides background knowledge on the Tennessee Education Lottery.  
Section 2.3 discusses my data and method.  Section 2.4 reports and discusses the 
empirical results.  Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation 
The Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation (TEL) was created in 2003, after a 
voter referendum amended the constitution to allow a state-run lottery.   The amendment 
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directs lottery revenues primarily to higher education scholarships for Tennessee 
residents attending public and private post-secondary schools within the state.  The 
constitution allows revenue in excess of scholarship needs to fund pre-kindergarten and 
after-school programs.   
 Subsequent legislation clarifies how lottery dollars are appropriated year-to-year.  
First, unclaimed prize money is placed in a special account to fund after-school 
programs.  In addition, lottery dollars available for pre-kindergarten are limited to $25 
million each fiscal year.  (Tennessee’s voluntary pre-kindergarten program is funded 
largely by general fund appropriations.)  As a result of these restrictions, college 
scholarships for Tennessee’s students have been, by far, the largest fiscal commitment for 
the lottery account.
5
   In addition, the lottery scholarship program is the most visible and 
celebrated work of the TEL.  Billboards and television advertising regularly tout the 
millions of dollars raised for higher education.  According to the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission, the TEL has awarded a cumulative $1.6 billion to 532,000 
students.
6
  Therefore, if potential lottery players are responding to a specific earmark, it is 
most likely the subsidy for post-secondary education. 
 The data for this study encompasses two lottery games; Powerball and Instant 
games.
7
  Powerball is a multi-state numbers game.  The player chooses five numbers 
between 1 and 59, and one number between 1 and 39 (the “powerball”).  Twice a week, 
numbers are drawn at random.  Winning the jackpot requires matching all six balls, 
which happens with odds of 1 in 195,249,054.  If no one wins the jackpot at a particular 
drawing, the pot remains intact and increases in size as tickets are purchased for the next 
drawing.  Including players in several states and inducing a low probability of any player 
winning the main prize results in huge, multi-million dollar jackpots.  Instant games are 
commonly known as “scratch-offs”.  Lottery organizers classically change these games 
                                                 
5
 In addition, this percentage is likely to rise in the current and next fiscal years.  As lottery revenues fall, 
the constitution requires that scholarships receive first priority, reducing the funds available for pre-
kindergarten.  Lottery outlay data come from the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration 
lottery account summaries for fiscal years 2005-2009. 
6
 Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship Program Annual Report.  April 28, 2011. 
7
 All information regarding the lottery games comes from the Tennessee Education Lottery website, 
http://www.tnlottery.com/howtoplay/ 
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frequently, keeping it new and exciting for players.  There are typically dozens of 
ongoing instant games at any given time. 
 The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program encompasses eleven 
separate scholarships designed to assist Tennessee residents with specific needs and 
backgrounds attend college.  For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on 4 specific 
programs which comprise more than 98% of awards.  The largest and most prominent 
scholarship is the Tennessee HOPE Scholarship, which offers a grant to graduating 
seniors from Tennessee high schools attending public and private 2- and 4-year 
institutions.  The grant is based purely on the achievement of minimum academic 
standards.  Because it is not need-based and can be used at any public or private school in 
Tennessee, the HOPE scholarship benefits families at all income levels. Students with 
superior academic achievement in high school receive an additional scholarship on top of 
the HOPE grant called the General Assembly Merit Scholarship.  Students who meet the 
academic requirements for the HOPE scholarship and come from low-income families 
are awarded a supplemental grant, the Aspire Award.  The final award which will be 
studied is the Tennessee HOPE Access Grant.  This scholarship is available to students 
from low-income families that meet reduced academic achievement standards in high 
school.  The Access Grant is awarded in lieu of the HOPE scholarship. 
 Many students receiving the HOPE and Merit scholarships are likely to attend 
college in the absence of the public program.  However, the Aspire Award and Access 
Grant are designed to make college accessible to students which are less likely to pursue 
higher education without a substantial public subsidy.  Therefore, they may have a 
distinctly different public good value.  In the empirical analysis that follows, I will use an 
aggregate measure of scholarships, followed by a series of analyses which separate Hope 
and Merit scholarships from Access and Aspire. 
2.3 Data and Methods 
Each of the models in this essay is a panel regression with monthly data from January 
2004 through December 2008 across the 95 Tennessee counties.    Summary statistics for 
each variable and year are shown in Table 2.1.  Each column represents the annual 
average for the year noted (with the exception of the scholarship variables, which are   
  
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics - Annual Averages 
 
2004 2005** 2006 2007 2008 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Per Capita Powerball Sales ($) 
  
2.08 2.08 2.31 1.99 2.00 1.80 1.69 1.54 
Per Capita Instant Sales ($) 9.30 5.31 10.04 5.36 10.75 5.19 11.16 5.48 10.93 5.30 
Per Capita Personal Income ($) 24858.82 4516.38 25870.44 4687.74 26854.34 5145.84 27980.37 5292.70 28780.81 5267.19 
Weekly Wages (x4.3 to generate a 
measure of one month's income) ($) 
2367.86 434.57 2424.96 429.29 2510.05 488.78 2589.10 483.83 2645.25 488.86 
Per Capita Scholarships (x1,000)* 1.99 0.00 5.65 0.00 7.11 0.00 8.72 0.00 9.35 0.00 
Per Capita Hope and Merit  
Scholarships (x1,000)* 
1.36 0.00 
 
3.99 0.00 4.76 0.00 5.93 0.00 6.53 0.00 
Per Capita Access and Aspire (x1,000)* 0.63 0.00 1.41 0.00 2.03 0.00 2.39 0.00 2.64 0.00 
Max Poweball Prize ($10 M) 12.95 5.16 10.53 8.74 15.79 7.75 12.08 7.86 12.43 6.42 
Percent age 65 and up (%) 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 
Percent male(%) 0.49 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.49 0.02 
Percent black (%) 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 
Percent hispanic (%) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Unemployment 6.34 1.57 6.62 1.85 6.12 1.70 5.68 1.37 7.68 2.01 
*Data for 2004 is August - December only 
         **2005 is the first full year of Powerball sales in Tennessee 
       
1
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averages for August-December of 2004, and the full year thereafter).  Due to 
considerable seasonality in lottery purchases, annual averages are a better representation 
of the growth of lottery purchases over the five-year panel.  Because Powerball tickets 
were first sold mid-2004, the summary statistics begin in 2005, rather than 2004.  Source 
notes for each variable are in Appendix Table A.15. 
I use two measures of income to estimate each model.  The first is per capita 
personal income, which is published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  According to 
the BEA, “personal income is a comprehensive measure of the income of all persons 
from all sources. In addition to wages and salaries, it includes employer-provided health 
insurance, dividends and interest income, social security benefits, and other types of 
income”.8  This income measure is published once a year, so it is constant for 12-month 
periods in the data.  The second measure, weekly wages, is published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics as a part of the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.  Weekly 
wages are reported quarterly by employers covering 98 percent of U.S. Jobs.
9
 The weekly 
measure is transformed into a monthly wage by multiplying each value by 4.3.  This 
measure is constant for 3-month periods in the data.  I estimate each model with both 
measures as a robustness check on the income elasticity estimate.  While personal income 
doesn’t vary much over the panel of the model, it is a more complete measure of income.  
In particular, it is likely that the weekly wage measure underestimates the income of 
wealthy individuals, as it does not take into account investment income and high-value 
job-related benefits.   
I include four demographic variables, percent of the population that is age 65 and 
up, percent of the population that is black, percent of the population that is Hispanic, and 
the percent of the population that is male.  The four “percentage” variables are expressed 
on a 0-1 scale to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients.  As they are reported 
annually, they remain constant for 12 month periods.  The maximum Powerball prize is 
                                                 
8
 Local Area Personal Income Release, April 21, 2011. 
http://bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/lapi/lapi_newsrelease.htm 
9
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  http://www.bls.gov/cew/ 
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included in both regressions.  The inclusion of this variable in the regression on instant 
game sales captures the substitutability or complementarity between the two games. 
I initially estimate a two-way fixed effects panel data model which will produce 
tax elasticity estimates that are comparable to estimates from prior research.  The model 
is as follows: 
ittmiittitit XPIy    
where ity  is the natural log of per-capita gross sales for one game (Powerball or instant 
games) in county i in month t, itI is the natural log of an income measure (discussed 
below) in county i in month t , tP is a vector of the top Powerball prize each month scaled 
by 10 million, itX  is a matrix of county and month-specific demographic variables, i are 
county-specific fixed effects, m is a vector of 12 month-specific dummy variables,    
are month fixed effects, and it are normal error terms.  I compare my estimates to 
income elasticity estimates from prior studies, such as Price and Novak (1999) and Oster 
(2004). 
The month fixed effects serve to net out seasonality in lottery purchasing 
behavior.  The county fixed effects capture any distortions in sales resulting from 
shopping across county borders, assuming that such shopping is consistent across time 
(Garrett and Coughlin 2009).  In addition, they capture educational attainment (percent of 
the population with a high school degree), as the data are only available at the county 
level through the decennial census.  The use of fixed effects is convenient for these 
purposes and the loss of degrees of freedom is tolerable.  In addition, fixed effects make 
economic sense because I am using data on all 95 counties to make inferences on the 
implicit tax regressivity for the Tennessee population.   
The second model will test the predictions of Morgan (2000) and clarify the 
findings of Landry and Price (2007) by including a variable to proxy for the value of the 
public good.   
ittmiittititit XPSIy    
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In the equation above, itS  
is generated using a data set that contains the home county of 
every recipient of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship.  From this raw data, I 
calculate the number of scholarship recipients from each county for each month.  This 
number is scaled by county population and expressed in natural logs.   In the third and 
fully-specified model, an interaction term for income and scholarships will be included to 
allow the regressivity of the lottery tax to vary with changes in the level of the public 
good provided.   
ittmiittititititit XPSISIy    
Three variables (per capita sales, per capita income, and per capita scholarships) are 
expressed in natural logs.  The use of logged variables is consistent with Oster (2004), 
Price and Novak (1999), and Garrett and Coughlin (2009) to generate a constant income 
elasticity measure.  In addition, this method generates an elasticity measure for the 
responsiveness of sales to changes in the number of scholarships.   
The next set of analyses will draw out more starkly how income affects the 
decision to purchase tickets in the TEL and how the use of lottery revenue for 
scholarships creates a greater incentive for higher income players than lower income 
players.  I create four dummy variables to represent the 10 highest income counties and 
10 lowest income counties by per capita personal income and weekly wages.  Figure 2.1 
summarizes which counties are included in the top 10 and bottom 10 by each measure, 
each year.  I run the three models described above, but add interaction terms between 
each income and scholarship variable and the top 10 and bottom 10 dummy variables 
described above.  This allows me to calculate unique income and scholarship elasticities 
of sales for the highest- and lowest-income Tennessee counties.   
In the final analysis, I will estimate the fully-specified model using two new 
variables which are subsets of the public good proxy variable discussed above.  Rather 
than using the total number of lottery-funded scholarships, I will disaggregate Hope and 
Merit scholarships from Access and Aspire scholarships.  It is possible that the public 
good value of Access and Aspire scholarships is different from that of Hope and Merit 
scholarships, since Access and Aspire are designed to encourage higher education by 
  
10 Highest Income Counties by Per Capita Personal Income (BEA) 
  10 Lowest Income Counties by Per Capita Personal Income (BEA) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Williamson Williamson Williamson Williamson Williamson 
 
Hancock Hancock Hancock Hancock Hancock 
Davidson Davidson Davidson Davidson Davidson 
 
Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake 
Shelby Shelby Shelby Shelby Shelby 
 
Wayne Johnson Wayne Wayne Wayne 
Hamilton Hamilton Hamilton Hamilton Hamilton 
 
Johnson Wayne Johnson Johnson Johnson 
Wilson Wilson Wilson Wilson Montgomery 
 
Lauderdale Lauderdale Scott Scott Scott 
Knox Knox Montgomery Montgomery Wilson 
 
Scott Scott Lauderdale Lauderdale Lauderdale 
Loudon Montgomery Knox Knox Knox 
 
Bledsoe Cocke Cocke Cocke Bledsoe 
Sumner Sumner Fayette Loudon Fayette 
 
Cocke Bledsoe Grundy Grundy Cocke 
Montgomery Fayette Sumner Fayette Loudon 
 
Union Hickman Bledsoe Bledsoe Grundy 
Fayette Loudon Loudon Sumner Sumner 
 
Hickman Hardeman Hickman Lewis White 
           
10 Highest Income Counties by Weekly Wage (BLS) 
 
10 Lowest Income Counties by Weekly Wage (BLS) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Roane Williamson Roane Williamson Williamson 
 
Hancock Hancock Hancock Hancock Hancock 
Anderson Roane Williamson Roane Roane 
 
Lewis Lewis Lake Lake Lake 
Shelby Anderson Anderson Shelby Davidson 
 
Pickett Lake Lewis Lewis Lewis 
Maury Shelby Davidson Davidson Shelby 
 
Houston Houston Grundy Grundy Grundy 
Williamson Davidson Shelby Anderson Anderson 
 
Lake Grundy Pickett Pickett Pickett 
Davidson Maury Maury Sullivan Sullivan 
 
Grundy Pickett Houston Sequatchie Clay 
Sullivan Sullivan Van Buren Rutherford Rutherford 
 
Benton Macon Cannon Houston Houston 
        
   
Blount Blount Rutherford Humphreys Humphreys 
 
Morgan Morgan Polk Bledsoe Wayne 
Rutherford Rutherford Blount Blount Hamilton   Polk Polk Benton Macon Cannon 
Shaded boxes represent counties that remain in the top 10 or bottom 10 for the entire panel.    
Figure 2.1. Highest and Lowest Income Counties over 5 years by Two Income Measures 
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students that otherwise could not or would not choose to pursue a college degree.  Hope 
and Merit scholarships, however, are more likely to be granted to students that would go 
to college anyway, and therefore represent a financial windfall for the students and their 
families, but not necessarily a public good benefit.  
 
2.4 Results 
The baseline regression results are shown in Table 2.2.  The coefficients on Per 
Capita Personal Income and Weekly Wage are income elasticity measurements, and their 
significance has been tested against zero and one.  A value less than one indicates a 
regressive tax.  A value greater than 1 indicates a progressive tax.  Although it is not a 
direct test of regressivity, due to the use of aggregated data, it is at least suggestive that 
the relationship exists on the individual level.  I find that per capita sales of Powerball in 
Tennessee using either income measure (IE= 0.105 and IE= 0.051, respectively) are less 
regressive than what is reported in Oster’s 2004 study using data from Connecticut, a 
state which does not earmark lottery proceeds (IE = -0.709).    I find per capita sales of 
instant games (IE = 0.051 and IE = 0.085) are considerably less regressive than in Texas 
(IE= -0.405, Price and Novak 1999), but more regressive than in West Virginia 
(IE=0.220, Garrett and Coughlin 2009), neither of which earmark lottery proceeds for 
specific programs.  I also find that a larger Powerball prize increases sales of both 
Powerball and instant games suggesting that they are complementary goods.  It appears 
that counties with a larger share of women or Hispanics purchase more tickets.  These 
results also suggest that a higher unemployment rate is correlated with lower lottery sales.  
However, Morgan’s theory suggests in order to accurately model the data generating 
process for lottery sales requires controlling for the value of the public good funded with 
proceeds.  In the second model, I do just that.  
The second set of regression results are shown in Table 2.3.  Here, I have included 
the variable which proxies for the value of the good funded with lottery proceeds, a 
county- and month-specific count of scholarships awarded from lottery revenue.  The 
inclusion of the proxy variable has little effect on the income elasticity estimates.  The  
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Table 2.2 Baseline Model Estimating Constant Income Elasticity 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.105 + 0.55 *+    
 (0.083)  (0.114)     
 Weekly Wage (ln)     0.051 + 0.085 *+ 
     (0.026)  (0.036) 
 Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.001) 
 Percent age 65 and 
up 
0.673  0.853  0.761  1.233 
* 
 (0.432)  (0.595)  (0.429)  (0.592) 
 Percent male -1.621 * -3.522 * -1.537  -3.502 * 
 (0.785)  (1.081)  (0.786)  (1.086) 
 Percent black -0.086  0.49  -0.113  0.388 
  (0.503)  (0.693)  (0.502)  (0.694) 
 Percent Hispanic 0.473  3.06 * 0.37  2.554 * 
 (0.493)  (0.68)  (0.488)  (0.674) 
 Unemployment Rate -0.009 * -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
  (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.2656 
 
0.494 
 
0.2574 
 
0.0973 
 N 5130 
 
5130 
 
5130 
 
5130 
 F(94,4976) 1386.04   647.02   1389.09   632.23   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
     County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above  
regressions. 
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Table 2.3 Model Estimating Income and Scholarship Elasticity 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.07 + 0.574 *+    
(0.083)  (0.115)      
Weekly Wage (ln)     0.05 + 0.082 *+ 
 
    (0.026)  (0.036)  
Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
-0.045 *+ 0.023 + -0.044 *+ 0.024 + 
(0.009)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.013)  
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.001)  
Percent age 65 and up 0.618  0.839  0.685  1.237 * 
 
(0.43)  (0.594)  (0.426)  (0.591)  
Percent male -1.551 * -3.38 * -1.464  -3.404 * 
 
(0.784)  (1.083)  (0.785)  (1.088)  
Percent black 0.104  0.578  0.081  0.455  
 
(0.506)  (0.699)  (0.505)  (0.7)  
Percent Hispanic 0.579  3.092 * 0.504  2.556 * 
 
(0.493)  (0.682)  (0.488)  (0.675)  
Unemployment Rate -0.009 * -0.006 * -0.009 * -0.007 * 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Overall R-sq 0.2761   0.0574   0.2719   0.0918   
N 5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 F(94,4881) 1417.92   655.77   1422.31   638.66   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
    County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above regressions. 
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coefficients on the proxy variable suggest that more scholarships are correlated with 
lower sales of Powerball tickets, and have a very small, possibly zero, effect on instant 
game sales.  However, this model estimates the relationship between scholarships and 
sales on average.  It is likely that scholarships are more important to higher income 
households, and that this relationship shouldn’t be constant.  Therefore, in the final 
specification, the scholarship elasticity is allowed to vary across incomes. 
The regression results for the fully specified model are reported in Table 2.5.  
Point elasticity estimates based on the fully specified model are reported in Table 2.4.  
Figure 2.2 plots income and scholarship elasticity at each observed value of per capita 
scholarships, per capita personal income, or weekly wages, respectively, using the 
following equation: 
                                                   
 
The point elasticity estimate of income is calculated at the mean of log scholarships over 
the panel.  The elasticity of scholarships with respect to income is calculated similarly.  
                                                         
 
Table 2.4 Point Elasticity Estimates of Income and Scholarships based on the Fully-Specified 
Model 
 
Personal Income 
 
        Weekly Wage 
Variable Powerball Instant Powerball Instant 
         Income Elasticity 0.058 + 0.539 *+ 0.053 *+ 0.075 *+ 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.036) 
 
Scholarship Elasticity -0.041 *+ 0.034 *+ -0.047 *+ 0.030 *+ 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
 
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.    
*Indicates that the estimate is statistically different from 1 at the  
5% confidence level. 
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In this model, I find that both games are regressive. Focusing on the scholarship 
estimates, I find that instant game sales are increasing in the number of scholarships 
using either measure of income.  Furthermore, Figure 2.2 shows that as income rises, 
sensitivity to the per capita level of scholarships increases. (Powerball sales seem to 
behave differently, which will be discussed below.)  Therefore, I can tentatively conclude 
that lottery play increases when additional scholarships are awarded.  This is a necessary 
condition for Morgan’s theory to hold empirically.  Furthermore, as the number of 
scholarships awarded in a county increases, instant game and Powerball purchases (using 
personal income) become less regressive.  This is clear both from the positive values on 
the coefficient of the  income-scholarship interaction, and from Figure 2.2 which shows 
an upward sloping relationship between income elasticity and per capita scholarships.  
This suggests that higher income counties are more responsive to the value of the public 
good funded with lottery proceeds than lower income counties. 
 However, the results for Powerball are less clear.  The point estimates of 
scholarship elasticity using either income measure are significant and negative.  
Furthermore, this relationship stays relatively flat across observed income levels.  In fact, 
using wage as the income measure results in a decrease in scholarship elasticity as 
income increases.  Although this is inconsistent with theory, there are a couple of reasons 
why this may be the case.  First, Powerball represents a relatively small share of total 
lottery sales at about 6%.  Second, there may be a misconception that, because Powerball 
is a multi-state game, proceeds do not stay in-state to benefit Tennessee’s programs.  In 
fact, the Multi-State Lottery Corporation, the organization that runs Powerball, concedes 
on their website that “the perception that the money leaves the state is one of the most 
difficult concepts we have to deal with.  Some lottery players actually refuse to play the 
Powerball game… because they believe that the profits go to the federal government or to 
some other ‘outside’ group.”  Therefore, it is likely that most Powerball purchases are 
motivated by a love of gambling, not in support of the lottery scholarship program.  My 
results are consistent with high-income individuals substituting instant game purchases 
for Powerball purchases with the intention to support the lottery scholarship program. 
  
 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Income and Scholarship Elasticity Estimates based on the Fully-Specified Model
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Table 2.5 Model Estimating Income and Scholarship Elasticity with Interaction Term 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita (ln) 
Personal Income 
0.357 *+ 1.407 *+    
(0.128)  (0.177)      
Weekly Wage (ln)     -0.18 + 0.676 *+ 
     (0.106)  (0.147)  
Per Capita 
Scholarships(ln) 
-0.652 *+ -1.737 *+ 0.318 *+ -0.911 *+ 
(0.207)  (0.285)  (0.162)  (0.224)  
Per Capita Personal  
Income (ln) * Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
0.06 *+ 0.174 *+     
(0.02)  (0.028)      
Weekly Wage (ln) * Per  
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
    -0.047 *+ 0.121 *+ 
    (0.021)  (0.029)  
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.037 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.001)  
Percent age 65 and up 0.731  1.167 * 0.591  1.478 * 
 (0.431)  (0.594)  (0.428)  (0.592)  
Percent male -1.461  -3.121 * -1.441  -3.465 * 
 (0.784)  (1.08)  (0.785)  (1.086)  
Percent black 0.114  0.607  0.076  0.467  
 (0.505)  (0.697)  (0.505)  (0.699)  
Percent Hispanic 0.288  2.247 * 0.646  2.192 * 
 (0.503)  (0.693)  (0.491)  (0.68)  
Unemployment Rate -0.01 * -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Overall R-sq 0.2733   0.0604   0.2723   0.091   
N 5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 F(94,4880) 1418.26   659.03   1421.68   635.03   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
    +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
    Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above regressions. 
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I find that the size of the Powerball jackpot has a positive effect on sales of 
Powerball and instant games.  Though the effect on instant games is very small, it 
suggests that Powerball and instant games are complimentary goods.  That is, players 
which are induced to participate in Powerball due to a large jackpot are likely to purchase 
instant tickets at the same time.  I find that a larger Hispanic population is correlated with 
higher instant game sales and is uncorrelated with Powerball sales.  This is consistent 
with findings from prior research.  Interestingly, I find that an older population is 
correlated with increased sales of instant games, and that a larger black population is not 
correlated with sales at all.  I also find that a larger male population is correlated with 
fewer sales of both games.  While neither of these results is consistent with prior 
literature, it is important to recall that these variables change very little over the relatively 
short panel of data.  Given the inclusion of county fixed effects as well, it is unlikely that 
these coefficients are particularly informative.  Finally, I find that higher unemployment 
is correlated with lower lottery sales. 
In order to draw out the distinction between the wealthiest and the poorest 
counties in Tennessee, I repeat the three models above, but interact each elasticity 
measure with dummy variables for the ten wealthiest counties and the ten poorest 
counties by each income measure.  The counties that are included in these categories are 
outlined in Figure 2.1.  Full regression results for each model can be found in Appendix 
Tables A.16 through A.18.  Table 2.6 presents point estimates of income and scholarship 
elasticity for the ten wealthiest and ten poorest counties in each model.  Point elasticity 
estimates for the third model are calculated using the mean values of ln(scholarships) and 
ln(income) for the top 10 or bottom 10 income counties, respectively. 
Focusing, again, on the scholarship elasticity in the third and fully-specified 
model, there is some evidence that responsiveness to changes in the public good is 
stronger in the highest income counties than in the poorest counties.  The effect is 
somewhat stronger when personal income is used than weekly wage.  Personal income is 
likely to be a better indicator of overall wealth than the weekly wage, as it includes a  
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Table 2.6 Summary of Income and Scholarship Elasticity for Top 10 and Bottom 10 Counties by 
Income 
  Personal Income   Weekly Wage   
  Powerball    Instant   Powerball   Instant   
         Model 1 - Baseline 
        Income Elasticity 
        Top 10 0.277 *+ 0.736 *+ 0.048 + 0.092 *+ 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.036) 
 Bottom 10 0.105 + 0.465 *+ 0.046 + 0.091 *+ 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.037) 
 
         Model 2 - Scholarships included 
       Income Elasticity 
        Top 10 0.109 + 0.596 *+ 0.071 *+ 0.104 *+ 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.038) 
 Bottom 10 0.093 + 0.508 *+ 0.112 *+ 0.035 + 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.039) 
 Scholarship 
Elasticity 
        Top 10 -0.008 + 0.086 *+ -0.047 *+ 0.031 *+ 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.013) 
 Bottom 10 -0.079 *+ -0.023 + 0.040 *+ -0.0411 *+ 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.020) 
 
         Model 3 - Scholarships and Income-Scholarship Interaction 
   Income Elasticity 
        Top 10 0.121 + 0.519 *+ 0.070 *+ 0.101 *+ 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.041) 
 Bottom 10 -0.382 *+ 0.468 *+ 0.224 *+ 0.133 + 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.075) 
 Scholarship 
Elasticity 
        Top 10 -0.010 + 0.093 * -0.049 *+ 0.052 *+ 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.018) 
 Bottom 10 -0.039 *+ -0.024 + -0.246 *+ -0.051 + 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.022) 
 *Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.       
+Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
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number of income classes, such as investment income, which are not included in weekly 
wages.  Therefore, it makes sense for personal income to be a better indicator of the value 
of college scholarships.  It is also worth noting that the difference in scholarship elasticity 
is larger for instant games than Powerball.  This is likely due to the unique features of 
Powerball previously discussed, such as the confusion about whether Powerball revenue 
leaves the state. 
As a final analysis, I have disaggregated the scholarship variable into two 
categories: HOPE and Merit scholarships, which are awarded based solely on merit, and 
Access and Aspire scholarships, which are based on merit and financial need and are 
designed to make college accessible to students that may not otherwise attend.  Full 
regression results are in Appendix Tables A.19 and A.20.  Table 2.7 presents the income 
and scholarship elasticity estimates for the two scholarship categories.   
The results show that scholarship elasticity is generally greater than zero for 
HOPE and Merit, but less than zero for Access and Aspire.  Furthermore, the elasticity of 
HOPE and Merit scholarships to sales is larger for instant games than for Powerball.  
This suggests two conclusions.  First, the HOPE and Merit scholarship programs, 
exclusively, increase lottery purchases among higher income individuals.  This is 
rational, as the Access and Aspire programs do not directly benefit these individuals.  
Second, this reinforces the earlier conclusion that people who are motivated to play the 
Tennessee Lottery to support the scholarship program purchase instant games, not 
Powerball. 
To test for the possibility that the largest counties are skewing these results, I run 
the fully specified model (presented earlier in Tables 2.4 and 2.5) excluding Knox, 
Davidson, Hamilton, and Shelby counties.  The income and scholarship elasticity 
estimates are presented in Table 2.8 (full regression results are in Appendix Table A.21), 
and demonstrate that the exclusion of urban counties has a minimal effect on the sign, 
significance, and magnitudes of the coefficients.   The coefficients on income elasticity 
decrease slightly, which is to be expected as the four urban counties are also four of the 
highest-income counties. 
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Table 2.7 Elasticity Estimates derived from Fully-Specified Model, Limited to the Specific 
Scholarship Types Listed Below 
HOPE and Merit 
 
Personal Income Weekly Wage 
Estimate Powerball Instant Powerball Instant 
         Income Elasticity 0.081 + 0.621 *+ 0.026 + 0.136 *+ 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.038) 
 
Scholarship Elasticity 0.005 + 0.044 *+ -0.005 + 0.038 *+ 
  (0.009)   (0.013)   (0.009)   (0.013)   
         
Access and Aspire 
 
Personal Income Weekly Wage 
Estimate Powerball Instant Powerball Instant 
         Income Elasticity 0.148 + 0.697 *+ 0.038 + 0.127 *+ 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.046) 
 
Scholarship Elasticity -0.078 *+ -0.017 + -0.080 *+ -0.020 *+ 
  (0.007)   (0.010)   (0.007)   (0.010)   
         
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   
+Indicates that the estimate is statistically different from 1 at the 5% confidence 
level. 
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Table 2.8 Elasticity Estimates Derived from the Fully-Specified Model, Excluding the Four 
Metropolitan Counties: Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Shelby 
 
Personal Income Weekly Wage 
Estimate Powerball Instant Powerball Instant 
         Income Elasticity 0.024 + 0.523 *+ 0.052 *+ 0.076 *+ 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.037) 
 
Scholarship Elasticity -0.036 *+ 0.37 *+ -0.044 *+ 0.032 *+ 
  (0.010)   (0.014)   (0.010)   (0.014)   
         *Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   
+Indicates that the estimate is statistically different from 1 at the 5% confidence 
level. 
 
As a second robustness check, I repeat the fully specified model, but exclude 
counties that border Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi, none of which had a state 
lottery during months of this study, to check for the possibility that sales across state lines 
may skew results.
10
 That is, sales in a given county may not be indicative of the lottery 
interest among that county’s population if a large portion of sales are to non-residents.  
The full regression results can be found in Appendix Table A.22.  Income and 
scholarship elasticity estimates are presented in Table 2.9.  While the scholarship 
elasticity estimates are unaffected, the income elasticity of instant games does become a  
bit more regressive when non-lottery border counties are excluded.  (Although Powerball 
regressivity when measured by personal income does change signs, in both regressions it 
is not significantly different from zero.) However, the change is minimal and does not 
affect the conclusions of this paper. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The research presented here contributes significantly to the existing literature on 
state lotteries by incorporating the theoretical findings of Morgan (2000).  Morgan 
suggests that the way in which lottery proceeds are spent matters to players and should 
have a causal effect on the level of play.  In particular, if the proceeds are used to fund a  
                                                 
10
 Excluded counties include: Dyer, Fayette, Franklin, Giles, Hardeman, Hardin, Lauderdale, Lawrence, 
Lincoln, Marion, McNairy, Shelby, Tipton, Wayne. 
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Table 2.9 Fully-Specified Model, Excluding Counties that Border States without a Lottery 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi) 
 
Personal Income Weekly Wage 
Estimate Powerball Instant Powerball Instant 
         Income Elasticity -0.069 + 0.340 *+ 0.049 + 0.064 + 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.039) 
 
Scholarship Elasticity -0.048 *+ 0.034 *+ -0.052 *+ 0.031 *+ 
  (0.010)   (0.015)   (0.011)   0.015   
         
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
    
+Indicates that the estimate is statistically different from 1 at the 5% confidence level. 
 
socially desirable public good, there are two payoffs from the purchase of a lottery ticket.  
As a result, risk-loving behavior is not required to induce participation. 
I test this theory using sales data from the Tennessee Education Lottery and by 
constructing a proxy variable for the public good using data on scholarship recipients.  I 
find that instant game sales are sensitive to the public good and less regressive than sales 
in at least one other state that has been studies.  Thus, instant game sales are consistent 
with theory.  When the elasticity of sales with respect to scholarships is calculated for the 
ten highest and ten lowest income counties separately, the responsiveness to changes in 
the public good is stronger in the highest income counties than in the poorest counties 
Powerball sales are not consistent with theory.  This may be due to confusion on 
the part of players regarding the use of revenue from Powerball, which is a multi-state 
game.  Some may infer that Powerball purchases do not fund the scholarship program as 
directly as instant game purchases.  If this is the case, then many more Powerball 
purchasers are motivated by a pure love of gambling, and we expect a more regressive 
incidence.  Finally, it appears that increased lottery purchases are not motivated by the 
two scholarship programs designed to increase education attainment among students from 
lower-income families.   
There are some important limitations to this analysis.  First, I am testing a theory 
which predicts individual behavior, but using county-aggregated data to estimate the 
model.  The empirical analysis could be clarified with a large-scale randomized survey of 
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Tennesseans to elicit an individual value of the scholarship earmark.  Second, this 
analysis is limited to one state.  It is unknown whether these results are robust to lottery 
participation in other states.   
Nonetheless, the results discussed here have important policy implications.  If the 
goal of state lottery design is to reduce the regressivity of its implicit tax incidence, 
earmarking proceeds for a “progressive” public good may be an effective option.  
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Chapter 3 
Testing for a Structural Break in Demand for 
Two Texas Lottery Games 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will further explore the relationship between state lottery ticket 
purchases and statutory earmarks on lottery revenue.  The Texas Lottery sold its first 
ticket in 1992 with the proceeds of the lottery allocated to the state’s General Fund, the 
main checking account for tax revenues and for funding state programs and services.  
However, as of August 1, 1997, the statutory earmark for lottery proceeds was changed to 
benefit the Foundation School Fund, which funds local K12 school districts.  This chapter 
exploits this change, first, to evaluate whether there is a structural break in the demand at 
the time of the earmark change.  Second, I will replicate the methodology employed by 
Oster (2004) to determine whether the regressivity of a lottery changes with prize level.  
However, I will alter her specification to take into account the (potential) structural break.  
I use sales data aggregated by zip code and month for two games, Instant games and 
Texas Lotto, a jackpot-driven numbers game.  Income and other socioeconomic variables 
are matched from Census 2000 Zip Code Tabulation Areas files. 
 I find that there is a structural break in demand in August 1997.   While my 
findings confirm that the regressivity of Texas Lotto changes with the prize level in a 
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way that is consistent with Oster’s finding, I do not find convincing evidence that the 
regressivity-prize relationship changes with the implementation of the K12 earmark. 
Section 3.2 provides details about the Texas Lottery.  Section 3.3 outlines my data 
and methods.  Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Texas Lottery 
 The Texas Lottery was created by Legislative action followed by voter approval 
in 1991 as a revenue stream for the Texas General Fund.  The first instant game ticket 
was sold in 1992. Late the same year, Lotto Texas was launched, a numbers game with a 
progressive jackpot.  In 1997, Texas began depositing net revenue in the Foundation 
School Fund, which serves as the primary source of state funding for local school 
districts.
11
  Unclaimed prizes continue to be deposited into the General Fund. 
 Over time, the Texas Lottery grew its offerings to include four additional numbers 
games, Mega Millions, and Powerball.  Although the addition of new numbers games has 
certainly cannibalized play in the original game, Lotto Texas, it has remained a popular 
game.  Players choose six numbers from 1 and 54.  In order to win the jackpot, all 6 
numbers must be matched in order.  Drawings are held twice each week.  If no players 
win the jackpot, it remains intact and increases in size as players purchase tickets in 
advance of the next scheduled drawing.  Lotto Texas is an excellent candidate to test 
Oster’s theory because it is, like Powerball, jackpot driven.  However, as Chapter 2 
discusses, lottery players may not understand that Powerball purchases directly benefit 
programs in their state.  So, Texas Lotto has the added advantage of being an in-state 
game. 
3.3 Data and Methods 
This essay will use two tests to detect any effect that the change in lottery revenue 
earmark may have on sales.  The same data set is used for both tests, which is comprised 
of data from the Texas Lottery Commission and Census 2000.  The Texas Lottery 
Commission has provided sales data for two games, Lotto Texas and Instant Games, for 
each zip code and each month from January 1993 through December 2006.  They have 
                                                 
11
 Texas Education Agency.  http://www.tea.state.tx.us/index2.aspx?id=7721 
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also provided the advertised prize level for every Lotto Texas drawing between 1993 and 
2006. There are two drawings each week, so for the purpose of this analysis, a monthly 
average of the advertised prize is calculated.   
I am using seven variables which are published by the Census Bureau as a part of 
Census 2000’s Zip Code Tabulation Areas: median household income, percent urban, 
percent African American, percent Hispanic, percent that has completed at least high 
school, the unemployment rate, and total population.  Zip Code Tabulation Areas, or 
ZCTAs, are built to correspond as closely as possible to the five-digit zip codes used by 
the U.S. Postal Service.  While they are not a perfect match for every address in the U.S., 
they are very close.  Furthermore, although they do not change over the 14-year panel, 
demographic characteristics typically change slowly over time, and the snapshot provided 
by Census 2000 is in the middle of the time period covered by my data.  Table 1, below, 
contains summary statistics for the first and last year of the panel.  (Variable descriptions 
and source notes can be found in Appendix Table A.23.)  I have reported annual averages 
due to the strong seasonality of lottery ticket purchases.  To compare the first and last 
month, January 1993 and December 2006, would distort the changes in sales over the 
panel.   
Over the 14-year panel of data, mean per capita purchases of instant games more 
than doubled, while sales of Lotto Texas decreased by nearly 70%.  The most likely 
reason for this decrease in Lotto Texas sales is the introduction of new lottery games 
since 1993, and, especially, the introduction of two multi-state mega-jackpot games, 
MegaMillions and Powerball.  However, for players seeking instant gratification, there is 
no substitute for an instant game.  
The use of Census 2000 ZCTA data presents some unique challenges in terms of 
matching the socioeconomic data with the sales data.  The primary issue is that as zip 
codes were added by the Post Office after the release of Census 2000 data, no additional 
ZCTAs were added.  There are 1,871 unique zip codes for which some sales data is 
provided.  194 of those are excluded due to a lack of a corresponding ZCTA file.  As the 
crux of this essay depends on a change in the lottery earmark which occurred in 1997, a 
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Table 3.10 Summary Statistics - Annual Averages 
 
1993 2006 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Per Capita Instant Sales ($) 7.34 14.71 16.43 35.93 
Per Capita Texas Lotto Sales ($) 5.24 11.88 1.62 4.23 
Average Texas Lotto Advertised  
Prize (Millions) 9.19 3.53 17.66 11.67 
Median Household Income 38161.37 15327.10 38904.38 16410.32 
Percent urban (%) 0.53 0.43 0.51 0.44 
Percent black (%) 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14 
Percent Hispanic (%) 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 
Percent High School and above (%) 0.47 0.11 0.48 0.11 
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Observations 17,244 
 
18,312 
  
 
loss of sales data after 2000 is not a great concern.  In addition, 249 ZCTA files have no 
corresponding sales data and are excluded.  There are two plausible reasons why there 
may be a zip code with no sales.  First, zip codes do not follow state lines.  Some zip 
codes may appear in a Texas ZCTA file although most of the population and land mass is 
located in a neighboring state.  It may also be that the zip code is so sparsely populated 
that there are no lottery retailers.  The average population for all zip codes in Texas in 
2000 was just under 14,000.  The average population among zip codes with no sales was 
688.  Finally, three zip codes were excluded because, despite the existence of a 
corresponding ZCTA file, no statistics were reported.  For one of these, the zip code was 
merely a P.O. Box.  The other two were in dense urban areas that, presumably, have no 
residents.  It is of some concern that sales in these zip codes will not be attributed to any 
geography; however, it is a tiny fraction of overall sales. 
 In each of the models, I control for the seasonal nature of lottery sales using a set 
of dummy variables for February through December of each year.  I control for the 
addition of new games to the Texas Lottery portfolio using a set of dummy variables that 
are constant across zip codes.  These variables are equal to one after the introduction of 
one of the five games that begins during the panel.  The five games which are introduced 
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over the pane (and the first month of sales) are Pick3 (October 1993), Cash5 (October 
1995), Texas Millionaire (May 1998), Texas 2 Step (May 2001), and Mega Millions 
(December 2003). 
 The first model is designed to test for a structural break at the time the earmark 
for K-12 education goes into effect.  This occurs on August 1, 1997. Therefore, I create a 
dummy variable which is equal to one for August 1997 and each month thereafter, and 
equal to zero otherwise.  In the first model, this dummy variable is interacted with each 
dependent variable.  I estimate the following model, using either Lotto Texas or Instant 
game sales as the dependent variable:  
 
                          
         
     
 
     
           
      
     
            
 
where     is the log of sales for either Lotto Texas or Instant Games,    is the average 
advertised Lotto prize in each month,    is the log of median household income of each 
zip code at the time of Census 2000,    is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics from  
Census 2000,    controls for the introduction of new games in the Texas Lottery, and 
  
    is the dummy variable which represents the change in earmark for Texas Lottery 
revenue.  The dependent variables in the model above were chosen because they are 
demonstrated components of lottery demand.  I test whether the coefficients on the K12 
dummy variable and on the interaction terms are significantly different from zero. If this 
is the case, it is an indication that there is a change in the data generating process for 
lottery sales at the time the earmark is implemented. 
The second model that I use to investigate whether the change in earmark affects 
lottery sales is based on research by Oster (2004). She uses Powerball sales in 
Connecticut to demonstrate that as the jackpot increases in size, higher income buyers 
represent a larger share of total ticket sales.  This implies that at higher jackpot levels, the 
regressivity implied by the lottery decreases.  She uses sales by zip code for each 
Powerball drawing over two years.  I will be looking at Lotto Texas, the only lottery 
game in Texas to run continuously since the Lottery began in 1992.  Although it is a 
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much smaller game with lower jackpot levels, it is the only jackpot numbers game to be 
sold both before and after the earmark change in Texas.  I will, first, follow Oster’s 
model: 
                             
 
In this simple model, I regress the log of Lotto Texas sales on the average prize, 
household income, and an interaction of the two.  This allows me to calculate an 
elasticity of income over the entire population of Texas and, importantly, to know 
whether that elasticity changes when the prize level changes.   
Next, I extend this model by allowing for a possible structural break in demand as 
of August, 1997.  I repeat the model above, but interact each term with the post-earmark 
dummy variable previously discussed: 
 
                        
         
          
          
               
 
This allows me to test whether the relationship between the jackpot size and regressivity 
changes at the time of the (potential) structural break.  In the final specification, I include 
the socio-economic characteristics.  Each characteristic will be interacted with the prize 
level.  This specification ensures that the change in regressivity in the previous model is 
not attributable to such characteristics.  I will also include the dummy variables which 
allow the introduction of new games to affect lottery play.  This equation will allow all of 
the coefficients to change post-earmark: 
 
                                        
         
     
 
     
      
       
           
             
           
            
 
Ultimately, Oster uses her results to suggest a jackpot level at which a jackpot-
driven numbers game may actually become progressive.  I will do the same using my 
sample, although because the jackpots in a one-state numbers game never approach the 
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size of a multi-state numbers game, it is likely that the out-of-sample prediction will not 
be a feasible prize level. 
3.4 Results  
 The first model is designed to test whether there is a change in the demand for 
lottery tickets at the time an earmark is imposed.  Full regression results are reported in 
Appendix Table A.24.  I find that both games are regressive and that Instant games are 
more regressive than Lotto Texas.  Both findings are consistent with prior research.  
Furthermore, I find that both games become less regressive after the revenue is 
earmarked for K12 education.  The effect is larger for Lotto Texas, which suggests that 
higher-income individuals motivated to buy lottery tickets due to the earmark are more 
likely to choose Lotto Texas that instant games.  A larger Lotto Texas Prize increases 
sales of Lotto Texas and instant games, suggesting that instant games and Lotto Texas are 
complementary goods.  The introduction of new games is invariable correlated with 
lower sales of Lotto Texas. However, the introduction of new numbers games increases 
purchases of instant games.  This is consistent with numbers games and instant games 
having a complementary relationship.   
However, the relevant question is whether the slope coefficients are different for 
observations in and after August 1997.  The results for the test that the interacted 
coefficients are equal to zero appear in Table 3.11.  For each regression (that is, using 
either instant game or Lotto Texas as the dependent variable), I use a Chi-sq test on the 
coefficients of the interacted terms.  These tests offer convincing evidence that there is a 
structural change in the demand for Lotto Texas and Instant game tickets when the 
earmark goes into effect. 
 
Table 3.11 Test Statistics for Structural Change 
 
Instant Lotto Texas 
Chi-sq test statistic 8516.85 10757.64 
Prob>Chi-sq 0.0000 0.000 
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 The presence of this structural break suggests that researchers seeking to model 
the demand for lottery tickets must take into account revenue earmarks in order to 
accurately model behavior.  The next model replicates Oster’s (2004) analysis, extending 
it to take into account the structural break. Her paper showed that when the advertised 
Powerball jackpot was larger, the regressivity of the lottery decreased.  Table 3.12 
contains the main regression results for this model.  In the left column, I replicate Oster’s  
model as closely as possible with my data.  In the right column, I have included dummy 
variables which allow the intercept and slopes to vary before and after the break.   
In Table 3.13 I have summarized the coefficients of interest.  The first column 
reports the coefficients from the pooled model in Table 3.12.  The second and third 
columns take into account the structural break in sales and report the coefficients before 
and after the earmark for K12 education.  The third column is calculated by adding the 
coefficient on each variable to the coefficient of the same variable interacted with the 
K12 indicator.  Finally, the fourth column tests the pre-break and post-break coefficients 
against one another. 
The most important coefficient is that on (Median HH Income (ln) * Average 
Jackpot).  This coefficient defines the extent to which the regressivity of the lottery 
changes when the prize level changes.  In each of the three sets of coefficients, my 
findings are consistent with Oster, in that as the advertised jackpot increases, the implied 
regressivity of the lottery decreases.  The size of this coefficient is slightly smaller after 
the earmark is implemented.  However, the regressivity of the tax implied by lottery sales 
is much less once revenue is earmarked for K-12 education.  This, along with the 
structural break in the sales equation, is further evidence in support of the theory 
described in Chapter 1.  Not surprisingly, there is not a significant difference in the 
relationship between the advertised prize and sales before and after the break independent 
of income. 
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Table 3.12 Basic Model for Income Elasticity versus Prize 
Variable Pooled Model With Break 
     Median Household Income (ln) -0.245 * -0.425 * 
(0.049) 
 
(0.05)   
Average Texas Lotto Advertised Jackpot -0.086 * -0.062 * 
(0.003) 
 
(0.01)   
Median HH Income (ln) * Average Jackpot 0.009 * 0.010 * 
(0) 
 
(0.001)   
K12 Earmark Indicator 
  
-3.697 * 
 
  
(0.152)   
K12*Median Household  
Income (ln)   
0.330 * 
  
(0.014)   
K12*Average Texas Lotto 
Advertised Jackpot   
0.005 
 
  
(0.011)   
K12*Median Household 
Income (ln)*Average Jackpot   
-0.004 * 
  
(0.001)   
_cons 3.527 * 5.382 * 
 
(0.509) 
 
(0.525)   
Overall R-sq 0.0128   0.1752   
N 244873   244873   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
  Season fixed effects were included in each of the above regressions. 
  
 
 
Table 3.13 Basic Model for Income Elasticity versus Prize - Coefficients of Interest 
Variable 
Pooled 
Model 
With Break 
  
   
Pre- 
Earmark 
 
Post- 
Earmark 
 
P-value for 
Ho: βPre=βPost  
Median Household Income 
(ln) 
-0.245 * -0.425 * -0.095 * 0.0000 
(0.049)  (0.05)   (0.048)   
Average Texas Lotto 
Advertised Jackpot 
-0.086 * -0.062 * -0.058 * 0.6568 
(0.003)  (0.01)   (0.003)   
Median HH Income (ln) * 
Average Jackpot 
0.009 * 0.010 * 0.006 * 0.0001 
(0)   (0.001)   (0.000)     
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The final model includes socioeconomic characteristics, each of which is 
interacted with the average advertised prize.  This interaction allows me to test whether 
the change in regressivity which has been attributed to the prize level isn’t actually due to 
non-income population characteristics. It also includes indicator variables which control 
for the introduction of new games.  Finally, each variable I have described for this model 
is interacted with the K12 indicator variable to allow the coefficients to take on different 
values after the structural break. 
The results are shown in Table 3.14.  The left column includes each of the 
variables that are not interacted with the K12 indicator, thereby representing the entire 
model before August 1997.  The right column shows the coefficient values for August 
1997 and after.   There is very little significance among the set of coefficients on 
socioeconomic characteristics.  Interestingly, it appears that a larger share of the 
population having at least a High School degree is correlated with more lottery purchases.  
However, because this particular variable is expressed on a 0-1 scale, the correlation here 
is actually very small.  Not surprisingly, the introduction of a new game to the Texas 
Lottery portfolio is always correlated with fewer Texas Lotto purchases.  
Most importantly, the coefficient on the Income-Jackpot interaction term remains 
positive, suggesting that even with the addition of several control variables, it is still the 
case that a higher jackpot draws in higher income players.  This effect is slightly larger 
once the earmark for K-12 schools goes into effect.  Finally, with this full specification, it 
still appears that, post-earmark, the game become less regressive overall.  
The results in Table 3.14 can be used to extrapolate the prize at which the lottery 
becomes progressive, which is to say that the following equation is equal to one: 
                 
                          
                                           
                    
The average advertised prize is equal to $14.9 million.  For the equation above to be 
equal to one, the prize would have to reach $371 million pre-earmark and $254 million 
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post-earmark.  That the necessary prize is smaller post-earmark is consistent with theory.  
However, both prize levels are highly unlikely in Texas Lotto. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This essay has used data on the Texas Lottery over a 14 year period to investigate 
whether there is a structural break in demand at the time that Texas began earmarking 
lottery revenue for the Foundation School Fund, which serves as the primary source of 
state funds for local K-12 districts.  I have found there is a structural break at the time of 
the change in revenue allocation.  Because this break exists, I have used the data to 
extend a model by Oster (2004) to take this break into account. 
Oster’s model demonstrates that as the jackpot size increases, the regressivity of 
the lottery decreases. However, my research suggests that this is not the only lottery 
characteristic which will reduce regressivity.  So, I estimate her model, but allow the 
coefficients and intercept to vary before and after the break point.  I find that, consistent 
with theory, the lottery is less regressive after the earmark takes place.  I further find that 
when the model is fully specified, the regressivity decreases slightly faster with an 
increase in the prize when revenue is earmarked for K-12 education.   
There are limitations to this analysis.  Primarily, some of the effect of an 
advertised lottery prize on sales has been muted due to the use of monthly averages.  
Sales tend to drop immediately after a large jackpot has been won, which will offset the 
preceding spike in sales to some degree.  Another drawback of this paper is that I am 
modeling an individual decision process and testing it with data that is aggregated 
geographically. 
Despite these shortcomings, the results presented here suggest that the 
regressivity of the implicit tax of a state lottery is not beyond the control of legislatures 
that create them and the quasi-governmental agencies that execute them.  Players appear 
to respond to statutory earmarks on revenue.  Furthermore, games with large jackpots 
draw in higher income players.  While lotteries are not likely to become a form of 
progressive taxation, the policies discussed here may provide some mitigation to the 
common critique that lotteries merely tax the poor. 
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Table 3.14 Income Elasticity versus Prize with Socioeconomic Characteristics and Indicators 
for New Games 
Variable 
Pre-
Earmark   
Post-
Earmark   
P-value for 
Ho: βPre=βPost  
Median Household Income (ln) -0.856 * -0.520 * 0.0000 
(0.069) 
 
(0.068) 
 
 
Average Texas Lotto Advertised 
Jackpot 
-0.024 * -0.043 * 0.0924 
(0.011) 
 
(0.003) 
 
 
Median HH Income (ln) * 
Average Jackpot 
0.005 * 0.006 * 0.1930 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
 
Percent Urban -0.052 
 
-0.096 * 0.0000 
 (0.048) 
 
(0.047) 
 
 
Percent Black -0.121 
 
-0.169 
 
0.1274 
 (0.146) 
 
(0.014) 
 
 
Percent Hispanic 0.143 
 
0.367 * 0.0000 
 (0.115) 
 
(0.113) 
 
 
Percent High School and Above 2.308 * 2.913 * 0.0000 
(0.27) 
 
(0.266) 
 
 
Unemployment Rate -0.097 
 
0.780 
 
0.0000 
 (0.536) 
 
(0.526) 
 
 
Percent Urban*Average Prize 0.003 * 0.001 * 0.0094 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
 
Percent Black *Average Prize -0.003 
 
0.000 
 
0.1266 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
 
Percent Hispanic*Average Prize 0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.5138 
(0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
 
 
Unemployment Rate*Average 
Prize 
0.015 
 
0.011 * 0.6476 
(0.008) 
 
(0.002) 
 
 
Percent High School and 
Above*Average Prize 
0.03 * 0.004 * 0.0000 
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
  Pick3 Indicator -0.035 *   
   (0.004) 
 
  
  Cash5 Indicator -0.201 *   
   (0.003) 
 
  
  Texas Millionaire Indicator -0.216 *   
  (0.003) 
 
  
  Mega Millions Indicator -0.733 *   
  (0.002) 
 
  
  Texas2Step Indicator -0.229 *   
   (0.002) 
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Table 3.14 continued Income Elasticity versus Prize with Socioeconomic 
Characteristics and Indicators for New Games 
Variable 
Pre-
Earmark   
Post-
Earmark   
P-value for 
Ho: βPre=βPost  
Constant 8.866 * -2.75 * 0.0000 
 (0.699)   (0.158) 
 
  
Overall R-sq 0.3796       
 N 244873       
 *Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
  Season fixed effects were included in each of the above regressions. 
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Appendix 
Table A.15 Variable Descriptions and Source Notes 
Data Source 
Instant Game Sales by county and month, 
January 2004 - December 2008 
Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation 
Powerball Sales by county and month, 
January 2004 - December 2008 
Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation 
Nominal Per Capita Personal Income, by 
county and year, 2004-2008 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Weekly Wages Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Scholarship recipients, Fall 2004 - Fall 2008 Tennessee Higher Education Commission 
Maximum advertised Powerball prize for all 
drawings in a given month, scaled by ten 
million  
Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation 
Population, by county and year U.S. Census Population Division 
Percent of the Population that is male Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Percent of the Population that is black Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Percent of the Population that is Hispanic Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Percent of the Population that is 65 years of 
age and older 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Unemployment rate, by county and month, 
January 2004 - December 2008 
Tennessee Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development 
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Table A.16 Model 1 - Baseline Model with Top 10 and Bottom 10 Counties by Income 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.102 + 0.466 *+    
(0.088)  (0.121)       
Top 10*Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.175 *+ 0.27 *+      
(0.077)  (0.106)       
Bottom 10*Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.004 *+ 0 *+      
(0.001)  (0.002)       
Weekly Wage (ln)     0.046 + 0.087 *+ 
     (0.027)  (0.037)   
Top 10*Weekly  
Wage (ln) 
    0.002 + 0.005 *+ 
    (0.001)  (0.002)   
Bottom 10*Weekly  
Wage (ln) 
    0 + 0.005 *+ 
    (0.001)  (0.002)   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.001)   
Percent age 65 and 
up 
0.672  0.883  0.784  1.154   
 (0.431)  (0.595)  (0.431)  (0.594)   
Percent male -1.753 * -3.495 * -1.545 * -3.51 * 
 (0.785)  (1.083)  (0.786)  (1.085)   
Percent black -0.184  0.561  -0.125  0.355   
 (0.504)  (0.696)  (0.503)  (0.693)   
Percent Hispanic 0.207  2.687 * 0.401  2.622 * 
 (0.504)  (0.695)  (0.489)  (0.674)   
Unemployment Rate -0.009 * -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.0891   0.000   0.2572   0.0837   
N 5130 
 
5130 
 
5130 
 
5130 
 F(94,4974) 1371.92   625.95   1363.29   595.91   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above  
regressions. 
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Table A.17 Model 2 - Scholarship Variable and Top 10 and Bottom 10 Counties by Income 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.112 + 0.538 *+    
(0.088)  (0.122)       
Top 10*Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
-0.003 + 0.058 +      
(0.106)  (0.147)       
Bottom 10*Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
-0.019 *+ -0.029 *+      
(0.006)  (0.008)       
Weekly Wage (ln)     0.052 *+ 0.076 *+ 
     (0.026)  (0.036)   
Top 10*Weekly  
Wage (ln) 
    0.020 *+ 0.028 *+ 
    (0.008)  (0.011)   
Bottom 10*Weekly  
Wage (ln) 
    0.060 *+ -0.041 *+ 
    (0.008)  (0.011)   
Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
-0.036 *+ 0.034 *+ -0.050 *+ 0.026 + 
(0.010)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.013)   
Top 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln) 
0.028 + 0.053 *+      
(0.018)  (0.024)       
Bottom 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln) 
-0.043 *+ -0.057 *+      
(0.011)  (0.015)       
Top 10*Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
    0.004 *+ 0.005 *+ 
    (0.002)  (0.002)   
Bottom 10*Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
    0.090 *+ -0.068 *+ 
    (0.012)  (0.017)   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)   
Percent age 65 and 
up 
0.664  0.948  0.737  1.396 * 
 (0.429)  (0.593)  (0.430)  (0.597)   
Percent male -1.608 * -3.273 * -1.337  -3.349 * 
 (0.783)  (1.083)  (0.782)  (1.086)   
continued next page                 
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Table A.17 continued Model 2 - Scholarship Variable and Top 10 and  Bottom 10 Counties by 
Income 
 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
Percent black 0.150  0.830  -0.471  0.561   
 (0.510)  (0.704)  (0.510)  (0.708)   
Percent Hispanic 0.306  2.608 * 0.774  2.253 * 
 (0.503)  (0.696)  (0.489)  (0.680)   
Unemployment Rate -0.010 * -0.007 * -0.008 * -0.008 * 
 
(0).001  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.2592   0.0297   0.2313   0.0881   
N 5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 F(94,4877) 1405.25   635.60   1409.10   605.64   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above  
regressions. 
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Table A.18 Model with Scholarship Variable, Scholarship-Income Interaction and Top 10 and 
Bottom 10 Counties by Income 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
-0.000 + 1.843 *+  
(0.200)  (0.277)       
Top 10*Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
-0.558 + -3.146 *+      
(0.416)  (0.576)       
Bottom 10*Per Capita 
Personal Income (ln) 
0.007 + 0.006 +      
(0.009)  (0.012)       
Weekly Wage (ln)     -0.023 + 0.398 + 
 
    (0.148)  (0.205)   
Top 10*Weekly  
Wage (ln) 
    0.033 *+ 0.024 + 
    (0.011)  (0.015)   
Bottom 10*Weekly  
Wage (ln) 
    0.049 *+ -0.038 *+ 
    (0.010)  (0.014)   
Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
0.435  -2.720 *+ 0.074 + -0.467 + 
(0.376)  (0.520)  (0.227)  (0.315)  
Top 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln) 
1.018  6.736 *+      
(0.841)  (1.163)       
Bottom 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln) 
-1.210 *+ 0.079 +      
(0.185)  (0.255)       
Top 10*Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
    -0.021 + -0.022  + 
    (0.011)  (0.016)   
Bottom 10*Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln) 
    0.254 *+ 0.074 + 
    (0.084)  (0.117)   
Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln)* Per 
Capita Personal 
Income (ln) 
-0.047 + 0.271 *+      
(0.037)  (0.051)       
Top 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln)* Per 
Capita Personal 
Income (ln) 
-0.092 + -0.644 *+      
(0.080)  (0.111)       
Bottom 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln)* Per 
Capita Personal 
Income (ln) 
0.122 + -0.007 +      
(0.019)  (0.027)       
continued next page                 
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Table A.18 continued - Model with Scholarship Variable, Scholarship-Income 
Interaction and Top 10 and Bottom 10 Counties by Income 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
Top 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln)* 
Weekly Wage (ln) 
    0.003 *+ 0.003 + 
    (0.001)  (0.002)   
Bottom 10*Per Capita  
Scholarships (ln)* 
Weekly Wage (ln) 
    -0.024 *+ -0.018 + 
    (0.012)  (0.016)   
Per Capita 
Scholarships (ln)* 
Weekly Wage (ln) 
    -0.016 + 0.063 + 
    (0.029)  (0.040)   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)   
Percent age 65 and up 0.802  1.055  0.705  1.389 * 
 
(0.430)  (0.595)  (0.430)  (0.597)   
Percent male -1.096  -3.232 * -1.315  -3.434 * 
 
(0.786)  (1.087)  (0.783)  (1.087)   
Percent black 0.561  1.466 * -0.386  0.685   
 
(0.519)  (0.717)  (0.511)  (0.709)   
Percent Hispanic 0.243  2.142 * 0.816  2.219 * 
 
(0.510)  (0.705)  (0.490)  (0.681)   
Unemployment Rate -0.010 * -0.007 * -0.008 * -0.008 * 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.000   0.0042   0.2399   0.0946   
N 5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 F(94,4874) 1403.16   616.73   1386.36   588.89   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above  
regressions. 
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Table A.19 Fully-Specified Model, Limited to Hope and Merit Scholarships 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita (ln) 
Personal Income 
0.338 *+ 1.612 *+    
(0.134)  (0.184)       
Weekly Wage (ln)     -0.304 *+ 0.792 * 
 
    (0.110)  (0.152)  
Per Capita 
Scholarships(ln) 
-0.519 *+ -1.977 *+ 0.512 *+ -0.989 *+ 
(0.201)  (0.276)  (0.153)  (0.211)   
Per Capita Personal  
Income (ln) * Per 
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
0.051 *+ 0.199 *+      
(0.02)  (0.027)       
Weekly Wage (ln) * Per  
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
    -0.066 *+ 0.131 *+ 
    (0.020)  (0.027)   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.001)   
Percent age 65 and up 0.836  1.169 * 0.656  1.424 * 
 
(0.432)  (0.592)  (0.428)  (0.591)   
Percent male -1.329  -3.04  -1.336  -3.488 * 
 
(0.786)  (1.079)  (0.786)  (1.085)   
Percent black 0.014  0.458  0.048  0.334   
 
(0.507)  (0.696)  (0.507)  (0.700)   
Percent Hispanic 0.264  2.005 * 0.709  2.108 * 
 
(0.506)  (0.695)  (0.493)  (0.681)   
Unemployment Rate -0.009 * -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.2679   0.0507   0.2723   0.0787   
N 5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 F(94,4880) 1398.77   654.25   1399.19   626.22   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above 
regressions. 
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Table A.20 Fully-Specified Model, Limited to Access and Aspire Scholarships 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita (ln) 
Personal Income 
0.483 *+ 1.291 *    
(0.141)  (0.197)       
Weekly Wage (ln)     -0.007 + 0.357 + 
 
    (0.119)  (0.167)   
Per Capita 
Scholarships(ln) 
-0.763 *+ -1.230 *+ -0.009 + -0.380 *+ 
(0.195)  (0.272)  (0.150)  (0.210)   
Per Capita Personal  
Income (ln) * Per 
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
0.067 *+ 0.119 *+      
(0.019)  (0.027)       
Weekly Wage (ln) * Per  
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
    -0.009 + 0.046 + 
    (0.019)  (0.027)   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.038 * 0.002 * 0.038 * 0.003 * 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)   
Percent age 65 and up 0.463  0.936  0.362  1.187 * 
 
(0.427)  (0.597)  (0.425)  (0.596)   
Percent male -1.897 * -3.502 * -1.851 * -3.649 * 
 
(0.775)  (1.083)  (0.778)  (1.089)   
Percent black -0.349  0.501  -0.361  0.381   
 
(0.501)  (0.699)  (0.501)  (0.701)   
Percent Hispanic 0.596  2.777 * 0.754  2.571 * 
 
(0.492)  (0.687)  (0.484)  (0.677)   
Unemployment Rate -0.010 * -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.2550   0.0624   0.2535   0.0906   
N 5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 
5035 
 F(94,4880) 1428.48   644.64   1434.88   630.86   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above 
regressions. 
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Table A.21 Fully-Specified Model, Excluding Metropolitan Counties: Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, 
Shelby 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita (ln) 
Personal Income 
0.381 *+ 1.387 *+    
(0.136)  (0.191)       
Weekly Wage (ln)     -0.2 + 0.607 *+ 
 
    (0.112)  (0.158)   
Per Capita 
Scholarships(ln) 
-0.765 *+ -1.726 *+ 0.352 *+ -0.799 *+ 
(0.226)  (0.316)  (0.172)  (0.242)   
Per Capita Personal  
Income (ln) * Per 
Capita Scholarships 
(ln) 
0.072 *+ 0.173 *+      
(0.022)  (0.031)       
Weekly Wage (ln) * 
Per  
Capita Scholarships 
(ln) 
    -0.051 *+ 0.106 *+ 
    (0.022)  (0.031)   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.036 * 0.002 * 0.036 * 0.002 * 
(0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.001)   
Percent age 65 and up 0.796  1.479 * 0.722  1.844 * 
 
(0.438)  (0.615)  (0.436)  (0.613)   
Percent male -1.246  -2.954 * -1.241  -3.299 * 
 
(0.8)  (1.122)  (0.801)  (1.127)   
Percent black 0.514  0.102  0.286  -0.173   
 
(0.537)  (0.753)  (0.536)  (0.755)   
Percent Hispanic -0.137  2.111 * 0.321  2.07 * 
 
(0.523)  (0.734)  (0.509)  (0.717)   
Unemployment Rate -0.01 * -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Overall R-sq 0.2724   0.0443   0.2698   0.0431   
N 4823 
 
4823 
 
4823 
 
4823 
 F(90,4672) 1460.15   642.56   1471.25   613.40   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above  
regressions. 
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Table A.22  Fully-Specified Model, Excluding Counties that Border States without a Lottery 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi) 
 
Personal Income 
 
Weekly Wage 
 
Variable Powerball (ln) Instant (ln) 
Powerball 
(ln) Instant (ln) 
         Per Capita (ln) 
Personal Income 
0.515 *+ 1.118 *    
0.139  0.198       
Weekly Wage (ln)     -0.05 + 0.54 *+ 
 
    0.112  0.159   
Per Capita 
Scholarships(ln) 
-1.242 *+ -1.553 *+ 0.102 + -0.713 *+ 
0.23  0.328  0.172  0.245   
Per Capita Personal  
Income (ln) * Per 
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
0.117 *+ 0.156 *+      
0.023  0.032       
Weekly Wage (ln) * Per  
Capita Scholarships (ln) 
    -0.02 + 0.095 *+ 
    0.022  0.031   
Max Powerball Prize 
($10 million) 
0.037 * 0.002 * 0.037 * 0.003 * 
0  0.001  0  0.001   
Percent age 65 and up 1.134 * 1.151  0.883  1.382 * 
 
0.465  0.663  0.461  0.657   
Percent male -0.869  -3.648 * -0.906  -3.912 * 
 
0.799  1.138  0.802  1.142   
Percent black -0.004  -1.915  -0.23  -1.933   
 
0.705  1.004  0.706  1.005   
Percent Hispanic 0.463  2.271 * 1.098 * 2.415 * 
 
0.522  0.743  0.512  0.729   
Unemployment Rate -0.009 * -0.008 * -0.009 * -0.009 * 
 
0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002   
Overall R-sq 0.3746   0.0183   0.4039   0.0153   
N 4293 
 
4293 
 
4293 
 
4293 
 F(80,4152) 621.14   469.86   606.01   440.76   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
   +Indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
   Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
      County, month, and season fixed effects were included in each of the above  
regressions. 
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Table A.23 Variable Descriptions and Source Notes 
Data Source 
Instant Game Sales by zip code and 
month, January 1993 - December 2006 
Texas Lottery Commission 
Texas Lotto Sales by zip code and month, 
January 1993 - December 2006 
Texas Lottery Commission 
Average advertised prize for Texas Lotto 
drawings, January 1993 - December 2006 
Texas Lottery Commission 
Median Household Income Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
Total Population Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
Percent of the Population that lives in an 
urban environment 
Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
Percent of the Population that is black Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
Percent of the Population that is Hispanic Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
Percent of the Population that has 
completed at least a High School diploma 
or equivalency degree 
Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
Unemployment rate Census 2000, Zip Code Tabulation 
Area Statistics 
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Table A.24 Testing for a Structural Break 
Variable 
PerCapita  
Instant (ln) 
PerCapita  
Lotto Texas (ln) 
     Median Household Income (ln) -1.293 * -0.797 * 
(0.072) 
 
(0.069)   
Average Texas Lotto Advertised Jackpot 0.007 * 0.041 * 
(0) 
 
(0)   
Percent Urban -0.229 * -0.019   
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.047)   
Percent Black 0.298 
 
-0.161   
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.145)   
Percent Hispanic 0.185 
 
0.165   
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.115)   
Percent High School and Above 1.682 * 2.683 * 
(0.28) 
 
(0.269)   
Unemployment Rate -0.593 
 
0.097   
 
(0.533) 
 
(0.532)   
Pick3 Control 0.367 * -0.035 * 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004)   
Cash5 Control 0.344 * -0.201 * 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003)   
Texas Millionaire  
Control 
-0.156 * -0.216 * 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003)   
Mega Millions  
Control 
0.277 * -0.733 * 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002)   
Texas2Step Control 0.235 * -0.229 * 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002)   
K12 Earmark Control -3.9 * -4.011 * 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.063)   
K12*Median Household  
Income (ln) 
0.37 * 0.375 * 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006)   
K12*Average Texas Lotto 
Advertised Jackpot 
-0.005 * -0.017 * 
(0) 
 
(0)   
K12*Percent Urban -0.016 * -0.066 * 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004)   
K12*Percent Black 0.078 * -0.004 * 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013)   
continued on  next page 
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Table A.24 continued Testing for a Structural Break 
Variable 
PerCapita  
Instant (ln) 
PerCapita  
Texas Lotto (ln) 
K12*Percent Hispanic -0.012 * 0.21 * 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)   
K12*Percent High School and Above -0.222 * 0.293 * 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024)   
K12*Unemployment Rate 0.231 * 0.866 * 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048)   
K12*Pick3 Control (omitted) 
 
(omitted)   
K12*Cash5 Control (omitted) 
 
(omitted)   
K12*Texas Millionaire Control (omitted) 
 
(omitted)   
K12*Mega Millions Control (omitted) 
 
(omitted)   
K12*Texas2Step Control (omitted) 
 
(omitted)   
Constant 14.281 * 8.046 * 
 
(0.727) 
 
(0.694)   
Overall R-sq 0.3789   0.2532   
N 244873   249605   
*Indicates significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
 Season fixed effects were included in each of the above regressions. 
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